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I INTRODUCTION: CONCEIVING FAMILIES 
 
The circumstances surrounding cases that challenge accepted conventions, practices, 
and values, in particular those involving the conception of the family and how those 
families come into existence, is understandably, highly charged. In particular, those 
cases which operate at the intersection of medicine, biology, technology, social 
expectation, and religion,1 and which could not occur in ‘nature’,2 cause the most 
apprehension.  They can only come about because of biotechnological and medical 
intervention.  As Dwyer observes, ‘these techniques may be desired by the subject, but 
may cause wider public concern.  Bioethics is therefore increasingly concerned with 
protecting the interests of society from the individual as well as the individual from 
society’.3  Brownsword suggests that there has been a loss of moral compass guiding 
individuals (blaming postmodernism and social dislocation among other things), which 
never occurred in more than the cohesive social structures of pre-modern society.4  
Thus, the State must intrude in problematic cases, overriding choices of individuals 
where necessary.   
 
In Australia, since the late 1990s, these cases have enabled a single woman to access 
assisted reproductive technologies (‘ART’),5 and a transsexual man to marry.6  The law, 
                                                     
*  Dr Marett Leiboff , Senior Lecturer, Law School QUT, Citizenship, Government and Identity 
Research Program, Law and Justice Research Centre, QUT 
1  A recent collection highlights the range of possible positions in these debates: H Kuhse and P Singer 
(eds), Bioethics: An Anthology (Blackwell, 2nd ed, 2006). 
2  D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford University Press, 
2001); R Brownsword, ‘Happy Families, Consenting Couples, and Children with Dignity: Sex 
Selection and Saviour Siblings’ (2005) 17 Child and Family Law Quarterly 435. 
3  D Dwyer, ‘Beyond Autonomy: The Role of Dignity in ‘Biolaw’’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 319. See also Donna Dickenson, Advisory Document for Retained Organs Commission 
(undated) University of Birmingham, Centre for the Study of Global Ethics 
<http://www.globalethics.bham.ac.uk/consultancy/Retained_organs.htm> at 2 December 2006. 
4  Brownsword, above n 2. 
5  McBain v Victoria (2000) 99 FCR 116; Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops 
Conference (2002) 209 CLR 372. 
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however, has been more ambivalent in the ‘sperm harvesting’ cases,7 where women 
apply to the courts to allow the removal of reproductive material from their deceased 
partner, with the aim of using this material at some later date to achieve a pregnancy.  
The applications provoke sharply divided responses from the community, involving the 
nature of family, the intervention in nature itself, and the effect on children through the 
circumstances of their conception, and the consequences of being brought up in this 
kind of family.8  The courts are, in effect, being asked to reach decisions that are both 
socially controversial and morally sensitive, in which the state itself may be seeking to 
interfere in the life choices of individuals. 
 
As such, the courts’ decisions may accept the role of the state in preventing individuals 
from pursuing their choices in life, and in doing so, their ability to have a family. How 
far the state should, in these circumstances, interfere in the lives of individuals, and for 
what reasons, end up being law’s problem.  However, these cases do not only concern 
individuals, but they also involve their broader family. The choices of an individual are 
not isolated in these cases, but are relationally driven through the family.  In this mode, 
Lior Barshack suggests the family needs to be seen as an autonomous jurisdiction, 
which the state should be reluctant to interfere with, because individuals derive their 
dignity and identity from groupings like the family.  State intervention can be justified 
for the welfare of the individual, if the integrity of the family is considered, and the 
actions do not eliminate human ‘self-realisation’.9  Fundamentally, the ability to have a 
child and continue a family line (or gene line), lies at the heart of the sperm harvesting 
                                                                                                                                                           
6  Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) (2001) 28 Fam LR 158; Attorney-General for the 
Commonwealth v Kevin and Jennifer and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2003) 
30 Fam LR 1.  
7  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Gillard J, 23 July 1998); Re 
Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35; Baker v Queensland [2003] QSC 2 (Unreported, Supreme Court of 
Queensland, Muir J, 6 January 2003); Re Denman [2004] 2 Qd R 595; Fields v Attorney-General of 
Victoria (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Coldrey J, 1 June 2004); AB v Attorney-General 
(Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 27 May 2005); YZ v 
Infertility Treatment Authority (General) [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 December 2005).  Internationally, a string of cases of this kind 
have received notoriety, in particular the Diane Blood case in the UK. R v Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority; ex parte Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687, in relation to the decision-making 
processes established under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Act 1990 (UK). See 
for example D Morgan and R G Lee, ‘In the Name of the Father? Ex parte Blood: Dealing with 
Novelty and Anomaly’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 840. 
8  In the appeal to the Full Family Court, counsel for the Attorney-General argued that marriage, in the 
context of the Marriage Act, should be interpreted from a monogamistic Christian perspective.  This 
was rejected by the Full Family Court, which accepted a broader social understanding of marriage: 
Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v Kevin and Jennifer and Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (2003) 30 Fam LR 1, 18–21. At the time of the appeal, Jennifer was about 
to give birth to a child conceived using ART.  Kevin was not, of course, the child’s biological father, 
but would father the child as a parent. In YZ v Infertility Treatment Authority (General) [2005] 
VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 December 2005) 
[50], Morris J noted: 
‘If there is such a thing as a perfect family, it is a loving, caring family; a family is not a perfect 
family simply because it consists of a father, a mother and children. As a society, we must get away 
from stereotypes. In my opinion, the fact that any child born as a result of the export of the sperm the 
subject to this proceeding will not have a father – or will be conceived from the sperm of a man who 
is dead – is not of major consequence’. 
9  L Barshack, ‘The Holy Family’ (2004) 18 International Journal of Law Policy and the Family 214.  
Compare with J Laing and D Oderberg, ‘Artificial Reproduction, the ‘Welfare Principle’ and the 
Common Good’ (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 328.  
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cases, and in this sense, forms the zenith of self-realisation.10  If the family disagrees 
with the woman’s choice, then her actions must be prevented by the State,11 but if they 
agree, then her actions should not be interfered with.  This conception of family is found 
in the decision of Morris J in the last of the Australian sperm harvesting cases, YZ v 
Infertility Treatment Authority (General):12
 
I should also observe that when the Parliament refers to the interests of “the family”… it 
is concerned about the interests of a unit.  I should also add that I would regard the 
parents and siblings of a deceased husband to be members of the family of that person’s 
widow.  In other words, the parents and siblings of XZ [the deceased husband] have a 
family relationship with YZ [the applicant].  Further, if YZ is to give birth to a child – 
especially if the child is produced using the sperm of XZ – the parents and siblings of XZ 
would be part of the relevant “family”.13
 
In comparison, Muir J’s decision in Baker v Queensland14 disregarded the interests of 
the family, including the parents of the deceased fiancé. Both families actively 
supported her application.  Her fiancé’s father said that it would have meant everything 
for them for her to have his son’s children and that it was their only chance for 
grandchildren.15  There was ample evidence he wanted a child, yet Muir J took the view 
that her fiancé would not want to her have a child in these circumstances: 
 
it must be even more doubtful here that the procedure contemplated by the applicant 
would have accorded with the wishes of the deceased.  Had he turned his mind to the 
question, he would no doubt have given anxious consideration to the best interests of the 
applicant and of the child or children to be born as a result of the proposed procedure.  He 
would have seen the existence of such a child or children was capable of restricting the 
applicant’s ability to pass beyond her grief and start life afresh.  He would have 
contemplated also the difficulties which face a single working mother and the constraints 
                                                     
10  The desire of individuals to have children is significant for their broader family, as shown by a 
decision of an Israeli court in early 2007.  The family of an Israeli soldier was given permission to 
use his sperm that was removed at the time of his death, so that his desire to have a family could be 
achieved.  He had no partner or girlfriend, but they had proof that he wanted to become a father.  The 
family chose a woman (who agreed to the circumstances involved) to have the child.  The Attorney-
General had refused their application to allow the woman to have the procedure, because only a 
spouse could request this procedure.  The court, however, accepted that the son wanted to have 
children, and the family was successful. The soldier’s parents will not interfere in the child’s 
upbringing, but will take on the role of grandparents. David Sharrock, ‘Court Clears Way for Dead 
Man to be a Dad’, The Australian (Sydney), 19 January 2007, 7.  
See also B Simpson, ‘Making ‘Bad’ Deaths ‘Good’: The Kinship Consequences of Posthumous 
Conception’ (2001) 7 Royal Anthropological Institute 1. 
11  I have argued elsewhere that a relational approach be taken to these cases – if the family agrees, the 
procedure can proceed, while if it refuses, the procedure must be refused: M Leiboff, ‘Of the 
Monstrous Regiment and the Family Jewels’ (2005) 23 Australian Feminist Law Journal 33.  
Simpson, above n 10, notes that ‘The consolations that the prospect of future offspring bring 
encompass extended family members also’, 11. 
12  [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 
December 2005).  
13  Ibid [40]–[41]. 
14  [2003] QSC 2 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 6 January 2003).  
15  Gregory Jason, ‘Death and the Courts End Family Dream’, The Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 7 January 
2003, 1.  In Re Gray, Mrs Gray’s father-in-law had also given permission for the removal of the 
tissue and subsequent procedure: Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 36 [6].  
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that would be imposed on her social life and on her ability to enter into a new relationship 
or relationships.16
 
The contrasting position of choice and family are starkly illustrated in these two sets of 
comments, and no legal basis can adequately explain the different positions taken.  But 
a conventional reading of the cases will bypass these comments and isolate the legal 
principles that derive from the case.  So while raising considerable policy, bioethical 
and jurisprudential debate, in a conventional reading of these decisions, they simply 
involve the law relating to property in bodies, consent to interference with the body, and 
questions relating to the best interests of the child.  Yet, following from the contrasting 
positions in YZ and Baker, the Australian sperm harvesting cases are split equally 
between decisions that would allow the procedure – the access cases - and those they 
would prevent it – the no access cases.  As will be seen, the assumptions and reasoning 
used by the courts conflict, and while conventional legal analysis will explain that the 
cases succeed or fail on the facts and law, factual and legal variations inadequately 
explain the differing results in these cases.  Instead, it will be shown that the judge’s 
personal views about the applicant and her actions, or their concern about the lack of 
choice or consent by her deceased partner, inform the outcome of the case, which can 
usually only be traced through the interstices of judgments, though occasionally, these 
personal views are overtly revealed. 
 
This kind of analysis - that judges impose personal views into decision-making - is 
redolent of the position that morals play a role in the creation and development of the 
law.17  But it also bears the trace of Jerome Frank’s realist assertion that judges work 
back from their decisions to construct the law, or the critical legal scholarship, which 
seeks to uncover the indeterminacy of legal rules, where the courts will use legal 
principles that best achieves the most desirable outcome over others.  Instead, this 
article takes a cultural legal studies position, in which it will see how the language of 
reason can be used to conceal personal moral viewpoints in controversial cases like the 
sperm harvesting cases.18
 
So instead of considering this question in conventional jurisprudential terms about law, 
morality and reason,19 I will consider the question in terms more akin to popular 
morality, as a trope of religiosity located within reason, and its adoption in the sperm 
harvesting cases. This approach is characterised by Jonathan Montgomery’s argument 
that the values imparted by religion should be considered as central to healthcare law,20 
otherwise it is ‘at risk of being transformed – moving from a discipline in which the 
moral values of medical ethics … are a central concern, to one in which they are being 
supplanted by an amoral commitment to choice and consumerism’.21 Thus, the moral 
policy found in law that initially denied Dianne Blood the use of her husband’s sperm 
                                                     
16  Baker v Queensland [2003] QSC 2 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 6 January 
2003) 4. 
17  S Veitch, Moral Conflict and Legal Reasoning (Hart, 1999). 
18  A Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul (Glasshouse Press, 2005), considers this same question as an 
attempt to create a legal sphere which is demarcated from the moral, through the imposition of legal 
form over moral questions. 
19  Among the large body of literature considering law and morality, the influences and relationships 
between natural law and positivism and considered in the collection: K E Himma and B Bix (eds), 
Law and Morality (Ashgate, 2005). 
20  J Montgomery, ‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26 Legal Studies 185. 
21  Ibid 186. 
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was overridden by an amoral ‘market issue’ because she was allowed to export the 
sperm under European law, despite the morality based legal arguments going against 
her.22  Choice without morality, in this view, is flawed.  But this is, as Simpson 
suggests: 
 
Clearly, the introduction of sentiment, by way of theological debate, [which] had moved 
the debate into a territory very different to the one mapped out for the autonomous, self-
determined individual upon whom legal and bioethical decision-making typically is 
predicated.23
 
It is this notion of sentiment via theology, or religiosity as a popular morality, that is the 
subject of my interest here.  Defined in the Oxford English Dictionary to mean 
‘religiousness, religious feeling or sentiment’ or an ‘affected or excessive religiousness’, 
religiosity provides a starting point to consider popular morality of a sort that is visceral 
and appeals to the senses through emotions ranging from a sense of what is right and 
proper, as found in Montgomery’s position, to one of disgust or revulsion, or ‘I don’t 
like it’.  While a conventional natural law position may be identical to this visceral 
religiosity, its methodological position is different, though the resulting outcomes will 
be the same.24  Thus, natural law’s use of properly ordered reason by following a ‘set of 
principles of practical reasonableness in ordering human life and human community’,25 
may reach the same conclusion, but through very different means.26
 
So, while both natural law and the more visceral religiosity will both see the creation of 
life as an absolute good, a natural law methodology will insist that any attempt to create 
life from non-vital means, such as the taking of sperm from a deceased man, which 
involves the creation of life after death, must fail one of the basic elements needed to 
create life - the requirement of vitality.  Any request by the partner must be viewed as 
selfish and irrational, but perhaps may be explained because of her grief.  A decision-
maker must refuse an application to harvest and use the sperm of her deceased partner.  
Indeed, any decision that allows the procedure must be unreasonable, and the reasoning 
of any court that allows the procedure must be wrong.  On the other hand, the visceral 
religiosity will respond in terms of disgust, displeasure, or very simply, ‘the yuck 
factor’, and applications refused because of the decision-maker’s distaste. 
 
In either case, to be convincing, a sufficiently moral decision needs to be dressed within 
law’s parameters, or bear some other mark of objectivity, rather than be expressed as a 
moral position.27  Using these techniques, such as a Hohfeldian language of rights,28 a 
sufficiently ‘legal’ outcome can be reached that accords with a personal moral 
standpoint or values of the judge in the case.  In order to ascertain how this occurs in the 
sperm harvesting cases, this article will juxtapose the judges’ views in key aspects of 
                                                     
22  Ibid 192-3. 
23  Simpson, above n 10, 7. 
24  T Honore, ‘The Necessary Connection between Law and Morality’ (2002) 22 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 489.   
25  J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980) 280.  
26  Compare with M C Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
27  To test this claim, adopting a cultural legal studies approach, I will examine what lies behind the 
black letter of the judgments and what the judgments say they are using as reasoning. What this 
means is that I will not analyse the law used to justify the decision. 
28  M Williams, ‘An Ethics Ensemble: Abortion, Thomson, Finnis and the Case of the Violin Player’ 
(2004) 17 Ratio Juris 381. 
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the cases, about the applicant, her actions, and the consequence for any child born of the 
procedure, to demonstrate how personal views enter these judgments.  In other words, 
this article will examine whether they conceal unstated or concealed views about the 
correct nature of post mortem reproduction, under the guise of rationality.  The 
conflicting decisions of the ‘sperm harvesting’ cases provide an extraordinary set of 
case studies which raise questions about the assumptions brought to bear in framing the 
legal foundation of these decisions.  This article will argue that the more strongly reliant 
the decision relies on the visceral religiosity, the more strongly reliant they are in their 
use of the language of reason, as a metonymic device to conceal underlying moral 
choices.   
 
II THE CASES 
 
Since 1998, courts in the Australian states of Queensland and Victoria have been asked 
to decide if widows (and in one case, a fiancée) can be permitted to remove 
reproductive material from the bodies of their deceased husbands, and if that material 
can be used by them in an attempt to conceive a child.29  For a short period of time post-
mortem, viable, living sperm can be harvested,30 and a pregnancy attempted using 
assisted reproduction technologies.  These applications have met a mixed response in a 
small number of Australian cases, all of which have been decided by single judges. 
Though the Queensland cases are based in the common law and the Victorian cases are 
based in the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) (‘the Victorian legislation’), there are 
points of commonality across the cases.   
 
A The no access cases 
 
Applications were refused in two Queensland Supreme Court decisions: the 2001 
decision of Chesterman J in Re Gray,31 and the 2003 decision of Muir J in Baker v State 
of Queensland,32 and in the 2005 Victorian Supreme Court decision in AB v Attorney-
General (Vic) (‘AB 2005’).33  In this case, while Hargrave J agreed with the principles 
set out in Re Gray, the decision did provide that AB was permitted to apply to the 
Infertility Treatment Authority, to export the sperm, though she was not permitted to 
use it in Victoria. 
 
A series of principles can be found in these cases.  Re Gray34 provides that the court 
does not have jurisdiction over cases of this kind, there is no right in a dead body other 
than to ensure its burial, there is scope for the potential application of s 236 of the 
Criminal Code (Qld), which makes it a misdemeanour for any person to improperly 
interfere or offer indignity to a dead body, and that the Transplantation and Anatomy 
Act 1979 (Qld) does not apply.  If there had been any jurisdiction, the lack of consent by 
the husband, the rationality of the widow and her state of mind and the child who has to 
live with the knowledge of the circumstances of their conception would mean that the 
                                                     
29  One other case exists relating to a dying man: MAW v Western Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 49 
NSWLR 231, in which O’Keeffe J declined to permit removal of semen from a dying man.  
30  The removal of the testicles and related tissue is sought in these cases in order to access sperm.  
Needle aspiration or biopsy of one or both testes or the epididymis: A Stevens and R Silver, 
‘Posthumous Extraction and Use of Semen’ Proctor (August 2000) 23, 23-4.  
31  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
32  [2003] QSC 2 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 6 January 2003). 
33  [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 27 May 2005). 
34  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
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application would be refused.  In Baker v Queensland,35 it was held thatcontract law 
cannot be used in place of property concepts in cases of this kind.  In AB 2005, neither 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the Human Tissue Act 1982 (Vic) would allow 
removal of the tissue.  Hargrave J followed the ‘non-interference’ or ‘inviolability’ 
principle36 in Re Gray,37 and distinguished Atkinson J’s decision in Re Denman.38  
 
Chesterman J had reached this position by drawing on the principles from a series of 
cases concerning burial combined with the principles of the criminal law relating to the 
improper of indecent interference with a dead body or human remains:  
 
It appears that the underlying principles of law are that those entitled to possession of a 
body have no right other than the mere right of possession for the purpose of ensuring 
prompt and decent disposal. The prohibition on interfering with a body sanctioned by the 
possibility of criminal prosecution indicates that to remove part of the body for whatever 
reason or motive is unlawful. The opinion expressed in Peirce [sic], which goes further 
than English authority, is but a logical extension of it.39
 
Chesterman J the adopted a Hohfeldian language of right, duty and correlative as the 
basis on which Mrs Gray’s application should be assessed and refused:  
 
The principle clearly established, that the deceased's personal representative or, where 
there is none, the parents or spouse, have a right to possession of the body only for the 
purposes of ensuring prompt and decent disposal has, I think, the corollary [emphasis 
added] that there is a duty not to interfere with the body or, to use the language found in 
Pierce, to violate it. These principles are inimical to the proposition that the next of kin or 
legal personal representative may remove part of the body.40  
 
However, as will be seen later in this article, the use of these concepts provides a 
metonym that disguises his Honour’s moral standpoint.  Hargrave J in AB 2005,41 
agreed with Chesterman J’s reasoning, but added in an additional layer to create a 
‘super-added personhood’ to the deceased person: 
 
it is a necessary corollary of the first two principles of law [no property in a body and 
possession of the body is for prompt and decent burial]42 referred to by him that there is a 
duty by those entitled to possession of a corpse not to interfere with it.  This reasoning is 
consistent with the principle of inviolability referred to in Marion’s case in respect of a 
living person.  In my view, policy and logic dictate that the inviolability principle should 
extend to a corpse in the absence of a statute regulating the extent to which violation is 
permitted.43
                                                     
35  [2003] QSC 2 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 6 January 2003). 
36  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 
27 May 2005) [136]. 
37  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
38  [2004] 2 Qd R 595. 
39  Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 41 [18]. 
40  Ibid 42 [20]. 
41  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 
27 May 2005). 
42  Ibid [132]-[3]. 
43  Ibid [136].  Marion’s case, or Secretary, Dept of Heath and Community Services v JWN and SMB 
(1982) 175 CLR 218, where it was confirmed that it is unlawful to interfere with the body of a living 
person without their consent: AB v Attorney-General (Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme 
Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 27 May 2005) [124]. 
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His Honour would have followed ‘Re Gray if the applicable law in Victoria was the 
common law’.44  That he went to such lengths in a case which he held was covered by 
the Victorian legislation, suggests that he sought to approve the moral standpoint found 
in Re Gray,45 in order to disapprove the access cases.  The real sense of the moral 
position of these decisions can be found in a coda to Re Gray,46 which Hargrave J 
expressly approved and quoted.47  At the end of the judgment, just after holding that he 
would refuse any application of this kind, Chesterman J commented that:  
 
Artificial reproduction is part of rapidly changing and expanding medical technology.  As 
science progresses the law will obviously face frequent challenges for which there may be 
no adequate precedent, although I do not myself accept that this is such a case.  It is not a 
proper criticism of the law that it has not developed a specific principle applicable to the 
opportunities presented by such change.  The law should not have to cater for every 
technological possibility.  Good sense and ordinary concepts of morality should be a 
sufficient guide for many of the problems that will arise.  When they are not the 
appropriate legal response should be provided by Parliament which can properly access a 
wide range of information and attitudes which can impact upon the formulation of law 
that should enjoy wide community support.48 [emphasis added] 
 
While the morality underscoring the judgment is made explicit, Chesterman J is also 
saying there is nothing wrong with the law as interpreted in the case.  While the final 
sentence appears to suggest that the matter should be up to the legislature, his Honour is 
instead saying that so long as ‘good sense and ordinary concepts of morality’ are used, 
decision-making in these kinds of cases will be correctly made.      
 
B The access cases 
 
Morality, in the sense of religiosity, does not have a place in the ‘access’ cases. Instead, 
these decisions adopt a test that may be termed ‘guided relationalism’.49  While they 
may initially allow the sperm to be harvested, they do not allow it to be accessed 
immediately,50 and examine attitude of the family (and where applicable, both families), 
towards the woman’s aim of using the deceased partner’s sperm to conceive a child.51  
The ‘access’ courts thus err on the side of caution.   
 
Three of the access cases involved this first step only, where the courts permitted the 
removal of the material: the 1998 Victorian Supreme Court decision of Gillard J in AB v 
                                                     
44  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 
27 May 2005) [142]. 
45  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
46  Ibid. 
47  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 
27 May 2005) [136]. 
48  Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 42 [24]. 
49  Compare with B Bennett, ‘Posthumous Reproduction and the Meanings of Autonomy’ (1999) 23 
Melbourne University Law Review 286; A Reichmann Schiff ‘Arising from the Dead: Challenges of 
Posthumous Creation’ (1996-1997) 75 North Carolina Law Review 901, who argue for a different 
notion of relationalism, which would refuse access to sperm. 
50  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Gillard J, 23 July 1998); Re 
Denman [2004] 2 Qd R 595, 598; Fields v Attorney-General of Victoria (Unreported, Supreme Court 
of Victoria, Coldrey J, 1 June 2004). 
51  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Gillard J, 23 July 1998); Re 
Denman [2004] 2 Qd R 595, 598.  
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Attorney-General (Vic),52 the 2004 decision of Coldrey J in Fields v Attorney-General 
of Victoria,53 and the Queensland Supreme Court decision of Atkinson J in Re 
Denman.54  Only one decision has actually allowed its use.  Morris J in the Victorian 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’) in December 2005, in the case of YZ v 
Infertility Treatment Authority (General),55 allowed material previously removed to be 
exported from Victoria to New South Wales, so it could be used by the widow in her 
attempt to conceive a child.  The decision in YZ adopts the tests set out in s 5 of the 
Victorian legislation,56 but in doing so, makes certain presumptions about YZ and her 
actions that accords with Atkinson J’s approach in Re Denman.57    
 
While there are a relatively large number of cases across the two jurisdictions, they 
actually form a smaller pool, because three of the four Victorian cases affect one 
woman: AB, or as she was to be known in the VCAT case, YZ.  The cases in which she 
was involved span seven years, starting in 1998 with permission being granted to 
remove sperm, and finally concluding in December 2005 with permission being granted 
to export the sperm for its use in an ART procedure.58 There is no way of knowing 
whether AB/YZ has been successful in achieving a pregnancy, but the seven years it 
took for her to attempt to do this indicates her strong desire to achieve this particular 
pregnancy.   
 
In deciding that YZ could now proceed, Morris J drew a line under this series of cases, 
and through the peculiar change of initials used to define the applicant, denoted a move 
from the Α ‘alpha’ (AB) to the Ω ‘omega’ (YZ), from the beginning to the end, and 
from the first and the last.  The religious symbolism that underscores this denotation 
marked the passage from the initial permission to access the tissue, to the possibility 
that it may be exported albeit within the context that the tissue should never have been 
removed, to the final permission to export it.  It suggests that these cases, as well, 
should be removed from the legal arena. As Morris J concluded: 
 
                                                     
52  (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Gillard J, 23 July 1998). 
53  Fields v Attorney-General of Victoria (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Coldrey J, 1 June  
2004). 
54  [2004] 2 Qd R 595. 
55  [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 
December 2005). 
56  Section 5 of the Victorian legislation provides:  
1. It is Parliament's intention that the following principles be given effect in administering this Act, 
carrying out functions under this Act, and in the carrying out of activities regulated by this Act –  
(a) the welfare and interests of any person born or to be born as a result of a treatment procedure 
are paramount; 
(b) human life should be preserved and protected; 
(c) the interests of the family should be considered; 
(d) infertile couples should be assisted in fulfilling their desire to have children. 
2. These principles are listed in descending order of importance and must be applied in that order. 
57  [2004] 2 Qd R 595. 
58  Morris J ordered that the frozen sperm could be exported to New South Wales on four conditions: the 
sperm must be transferred directly to Sydney IVF Ltd; it could only be used under its the control and 
supervision; it could only be used in a treatment procedure or procedures using gametes of YZ to 
produce an embryo or embryos to be implanted in her; and any live birth resulting from the use of the 
sperm must be reported to the Infertility Treatment Authority (Vic) and information must be provided 
to the Authority concerning the treatment procedure, the persons who provided the gametes, the 
person to whom the child was born, the sex of the baby and any other reasonable information 
required by the Authority.  
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ethics committees are required to deal with difficult moral and philosophical issues which 
do not always permit a single answer. If the answers were always obvious, we would not 
need ethics committees. Courts and tribunals should not unreasonably confine the scope 
of decisions that ethics committees must make.59
 
On the other hand, in Re Gray,60 and Baker v Queensland,61 Mrs Gray and Ms Baker 
had lines irrevocably drawn through their ability to ever have the child they sought, or 
to create or enhance their family, despite the agreement of the families of their deceased 
partners.  In these cases, law was used to make ethical and moral decisions, which 
Morris J implicitly criticises in this statement.  Refusing access to the tissue meant that 
any further examination of the applicant’s choice was over.    
 
But at another level, these cases bear the traces of ‘unreason’.  In Mrs Gray’s case, 
reasons for the refusal to allow her access to the sperm were published two weeks after 
Chesterman J’s decision.  She did not know the legal basis on which the refusal was 
founded.  In the end, the court decided it did not have jurisdiction over the matter, yet 
reached a series of conclusions why the application must be rejected.  Muir J was able 
to refuse her application despite the approval of her fiancé’s family.  And while counsel 
had sought to argue the case based on contract law, to distinguish it from Re Gray,62 
Muir J did not accept this distinction, holding that the facts were not different from Re 
Gray,63 and the application was rejected.  The decision could not be undone; once the 
viability of the tissue was lost, all chance of a pregnancy was ended.  It was precisely 
for this reason that Atkinson J in Re Denman64 allowed the tissue to be removed.  
Analogous to an injunction, if the tissue was harvested, then a later decision could be 
made about its use.  If the tissue was not harvested, then the action would be lost for 
good.  
 
Though Atkinson J explained the differences in the Queensland cases on a different 
reading of ‘public policy arguments’,65 by juxtaposing key attitudes expressed by the 
courts in Re Gray,66 and AB 2005,67 on the one side, and Re Denman,68 and YZ,69 on 
the other, I will suggest that personal, visceral attitudes towards the procedures and the 
nature of family that would result, are the key factors which guided the decisions in the 
no access cases.  These attitudes are revealed through the court’s views in four areas: 
the indignity to the corpse, the effect on the child, the intention of the deceased, and the 
applicant’s state of mind. 
C Indignity to the corpse 
 
                                                     
59  YZ v Infertility Treatment Authority (General) [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 December 2005) [65]. 
60  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
61  [2003] QSC 2 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Muir J, 6 January 2003). 
62  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
63  Ibid.  
64  [2004] 2 Qd R 595. 
65  Re Denman [2004] 2 Qd R 595, 597. 
66  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
67  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 
27 May 2005). 
68  [2004] 2 Qd R 595. 
69  YZ v Infertility Treatment Authority (General) [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 December 2005). 
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The key determinate driving the no access cases was the principle of inviolability, that 
there is a duty not to interfere with the body or to violate it, which includes the removal 
of any part of the body.  As referred to earlier, Hargrave J in AB 2005 approved this 
principle: ‘In my view, policy and logic dictate that the inviolability principle should 
extend to a corpse in the absence of a statute regulating the extent to which violation is 
permitted.’70  But it is how Chesterman J reached this position that provides a clear 
insight into the personal sense of disquiet about the treatment of the body in this way: 
 
It should also be noted that s 236 of the Criminal Code makes it a misdemeanour for any 
person, without lawful justification or excuse the proof of which lies on the accused, to 
improperly or indecently interfere with or offer any indignity to any dead body or human 
remains.  On an indictment prosecuting such an offence it would no doubt be for the jury 
to decide what is improper or indecent, or an indignity, but it would seem at least 
arguable that removing part of the testicles of a dead man would come within the ambit 
of those words … Anybody with access to the body may help themselves to part of it.  
The limitation imposed by the laws defending public decency or s 236 of the Criminal 
Code appear altogether too uncertain to determine who may and who may not plunder a 
corpse and for what purposes.71 (emphasis added) 
 
This is a speculative invocation of the criminal law, in order to vilify the widow who 
helps herself to or plunders part of her husband’s body.  This is emotive language that 
clearly suggests a very personal attitude to the application, and does not hide behind the 
reasoned basis for the refusal of access to the body that forms the principle found in the 
case.  It is a stridently visceral response based on a sense of what should properly 
happen to a body after death.  Atkinson J in Re Denman reads the same action very 
differently, seemingly as a direct response to Chesterman J’s position: 
 
It appears to me at least strongly arguable that removing the testes of a dead man in order 
to harvest sperm could not be seen as indecently interfering with or offering indignity to 
that body, particularly when it is his widow who wishes to have that sperm in accordance 
with the keenly expressed desire of both herself and her recently deceased husband to 
have children.72 (emphasis added) 
 
D The effect on the child 
 
The contrast in the two positions could not be more marked.  But the key question must 
relate to the circumstances of the child’s conception, and the effect this would have on 
the child itself.  The no access cases make the position clear.  Though deciding that 
there was no jurisdiction to allow the procedure, if there had been, Chesterman J would 
have refused the application:  
 
The interests of any child born as a result of the procedure must be of particular 
importance in the exercise of the discretion.  I cannot see how it can be said that the 
interests of such a child will be advanced by inevitable fatherlessness.  The very nature of 
the conception may cause the child embarrassment or more serious emotional problems 
as it grows up.  More significant, because the court can never know in what 
                                                     
70  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 
27 May 2005) [136]. 
71  Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 40–41, [17], [21]. 
72  Re Denman [2004] 2 Qd R 595, 597. 
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circumstances the child may be born and brought up, it is impossible to know what is in 
its best interests.73
 
There is a strong sense of disquiet that a child may be born who was conceived in these 
circumstances.  There are strongly visceral responses here – how could the child live 
with the circumstances of its birth?  But because a child could never be born, it would 
never know whether it would be angry, embarrassed, disgusted, or happy about its birth, 
or would prefer not to have been born.  No one would know unless they were born, and 
once living, would have to live with the actions its mother and family.  The personal 
views of individual children may be very different, and they may resent the 
circumstances of their conception.  
 
This issue was considered by Morris J, who was of the view that the ‘fact that the child 
will be conceived after the death of one biological parent is not a sufficient reason to 
refuse consent to the export of the sperm’.74  In noting that there was very little research 
on the question about the well-being of children born in these circumstances, Morris J 
drew ‘comfort from the expressed attitude of relevant family members.’75  Indeed, these 
factors were tested against s 5 of the Victorian legislation, which requires that the 
‘welfare and interests of any person born is paramount’.  Morris J took as central the 
question whether ‘a person, to be born as a result of a treatment … will be nourished, 
loved and supported’.76   
 
Chesterman J also hinted that being brought up by the mother in a single parent 
household, through ‘inevitable fatherlessness’ presumes that without the father as head 
of that family, the circumstances of its upbringing must be unacceptable.  Atkinson J in 
Re Denman again answers Chesterman J: 
 
It is certainly the case that any child born, if that were to happen as a result of successful 
posthumous reproduction, would be born without a father, but children have been born 
without fathers for a very long time … No doubt it is preferable for a child to have not 
one but two parents, both of whom fulfil their parental responsibilities, but many children 
do not have that, and there are many children who do extremely well in one parent 
families.  It cannot be thought that because the child will only have one living parent that 
will necessarily not be in its best interests, particularly when the alternative is for the 
child not to exist at all.77
 
Morris J adopted the same view: 
 
I am satisfied that the applicant has the will and the capacity to provide this love and care.  
I am also satisfied that the child will have the support of others – including the immediate 
family of XZ – which will enhance the child’s welfare.  In my opinion, the fact that the 
child will not have a father is not a sufficient reason to refuse to consent to the export of 
the sperm.  It is trite to observe that many children born naturally do not have a father – 
or a loving father – yet still live long and happy lives.78
                                                     
73  Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 41 [23]. 
74  YZ v Infertility Treatment Authority (General) [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 December 2005) [49]. 
75  Ibid.  
76  Ibid [37]. 
77  Re Denman [2004] 2 Qd R 595, 59. 
78  YZ v Infertility Treatment Authority (General) [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 December 2005) [47]-[8].  
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E The intention of the deceased 
 
The views of the deceased and his intention to have a child form a fundamental point of 
disagreement between the two sides of the judicial line.  Chesterman J refused to 
countenance an implied notion of consent: 
 
The deceased did not in his lifetime indicate his consent to such a procedure.  He did not, 
naturally enough, ever turn his mind to such an eventuality.  While it may be accepted 
that he desired another child it was a desire he wished to consummate in his lifetime.  
There is no reason to believe he wished his wife to be impregnated posthumously.79
 
The notion that a child could only be conceived from the active involvement of the male 
parent, is deeply imbued in this comment.80  It speaks of the need for the child to be the 
result of the desire of the male parent, as a naturally ordered action.  On the other hand, 
Morris J answered this view in these terms: 
 
I conclude these reasons by making this observation.  In my opinion, there is every reason 
to think that XZ would now want his sperm to be used to produce children mothered by 
YZ, if this is the course desired by YZ.  Most people who die accept that they cannot, and 
should not, seek to rule from the grave.  Rather they leave on-going decisions to the 
living; especially to the living who they love or respect. (footnotes removed)81
 
In reaching this conclusion, Morris J was particularly concerned that the notion of 
consent must be read in terms of how people go about expressing choice - ‘by words or 
by conduct – not by legal instrument’.82  In this case, it ‘was clearly expressed and 
witnessed’.83
 
F The applicant’s state of mind 
 
Knowing what the husband thought is one thing, but the state of mind of the applicant is 
also of considerable debate.  In Re Gray, Chesterman J was sceptical about the 
applicant’s state of mind: 
 
The court could have no confidence that the applicant's desire is a result of careful or 
rational deliberation.  Given the need for urgent removal and the circumstances of her 
husband's death the applicant must have been suffering greatly from grief and shock.  The 
decision made under the effect of such emotions is one she may well come to regret.  It 
may not reflect her true desire or her assessment of what is best for herself and her 
child.84
 
Chesterman J did not contemplate a deferral of the final decision-making, clearly 
believing that the decision to take the tissue from the husband itself was problematic.85  
In comparison, in YZ, Morris J noted that in the seven years since here husband died, 
YZ had not remarried or repartnered, and she had no wish to do so.  She did not want to 
                                                     
79  Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 41 [23]. 
80  Leiboff, above n 11. 
81  YZ v Infertility Treatment Authority (General) [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 December 2005) [70]. 
82  Ibid [66]. 
83  Ibid [67]. 
84  Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 41 [23]. 
85  Leiboff, above n 11. 
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have children from an anonymous donor, but ‘wishes to have a child, or children, using 
her late husband’s sperm as she regards him as her life partner and wants him to be the 
genetic father of her children’.86  Morris J did not find that she was ‘motivated by grief’, 
and though other widows would not take this course of action, found ‘her decision is 
rational and genuine’.87  He had already considered that the Ethics Committee at 
Sydney IVF, where the procedure would be carried out, had investigated her desire to 
have a child, and they were satisfied about the nature of XZs consent.88
 
These comparisons show the extent of deeply contested divisions that exist in the views 
in these decisions, which serve to highlight the inevitable sense that the no access cases 
are based on personal values that fundamentally disapprove of the possibility of post 
mortem reproduction in all its forms.  But these views are not made explicit in the legal 
reasoning which are extracted from the decisions.  They have only come to light by 
taking a different reading of the text of the decisions, which would otherwise be 
dislocated from the principles of the case.  Thus, Re Gray and AB 2005 stand for the 
legal principle that the only purpose for which a body may be possessed by a spouse of 
family member is to ensure its prompt burial, and that no spouse or family member can 
violate a corpse.  In this sense, it appears incontrovertible, extracted from the other parts 
of the text in Re Gray.  How this principle is explained in the language of objectivity, 
neutrality, and reason, while disguising the underlying attitudes in Re Gray, forms the 
subject of the next part of this article.  
 
III DISGUISING RELIGIOSITY IN RE GRAY: HOHFELDIAN CORRELATES, RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES 
 
As noted earlier in this article, the decision and legal principle is structured as being 
highly reasonable, using the language of the Hohfeldian correlates of ‘right and duty’.  
Hohfeld’s theory is an exercise in philosophical pragmatism in which fundamental legal 
concepts could be identified, to then be used to facilitate the processes of judicial 
reasoning.89  I will suggest that his Honour adopted this approach in order to sanction 
the decision with the indicia of logic, objectivity and legality, and mirrors John Finnis’ 
partial use of Hohfeld in order to render a moral argument against abortion.90  I will 
suggest that the use of Hohfeld provides the metonym for reason and rationality in place 
of personal viewpoints, visceral religiosity or natural law that underscores the decision 
in Re Gray.91  In doing so, it must be acknowledged that while Chesterman J himself 
did not expressly refer to Hohfeld in this decision, the elements of Hohfeld are apparent 
in the implicit relationalism just described.    
 
For this reason, I want to return to consider the statement of the inviolability principle in 
Re Gray: 
 
The principle clearly established, that the deceased’s personal representative or, where 
there is none, the parents or spouse, have a right to possession of the body only for the 
                                                     
86  YZ v Infertility Treatment Authority (General) [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 December 2005) [17]. 
87  Ibid [18]. 
88  Ibid [16]. 
89  W N Hohfeld (ed W W Cook), Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 
(Greenwood Press, c1919, republished 1978). 
90  Williams above n 28. 
91  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
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purposes of ensuring prompt and decent disposal has, I think, the corollary that there is a 
duty not to interfere with the body or, to use the language found in Pierce, to violate it.  
These principles are inimical to the proposition that the next of kin or legal personal 
representatives may remove part of the body.92
 
Thus the notion of right had to have some kind of real legal meaning, as opposed to 
some kind of abstract notion which had no legal significance.  As has been seen, a 
Hohfeldian right bears its meaning through its correlate, where another person has a 
duty with respect to the right bearing person.  So, where there is no correlate of duty, it 
is impossible for a person to have a right.  If there is no such right, the person may have 
a privilege or liberty, where the correlate is no-right.  Liberty is, in this sense, the 
choices we have to do what we want without legal burden, and questions like those 
concerning the sperm harvesting cases potentially exist with out the correlative of right, 
instead suggesting liberty,93 because the theory is ultimately relational.94  
 
So here, the duty not to interfere follows from the right to possession of the body for 
burial.  But how can this logically follow?  This formula is self-referential, taking as it 
does the relationship between the right of possession and a duty (to whom?) not to 
interfere with the body.  The only person, as such, can be the deceased spouse, though 
there is no legal status of personality, as such, held by a deceased person, meaning the 
dead cannot have rights.95  But as Ngaire Naffine points out, law can constitute 
personhood for whatever purpose it wants.96  However, Matthew Kramer suggests that 
there is a possibility that the dead have rights,97 based on ‘subsuming the aftermath of 
each dead person's life within the overall course of his or her existence’:98  This 
involves acknowledging:  
 
the continuing influence of the dead person on other people and on the development of 
various events, the memories of him that reside in the minds of people who knew him or 
knew of him, and the array of possessions which he accumulated and then bequeathed or 
failed to bequeath--we can highlight the ways in which the dead person still exists.  He 
endures, of course, not typically as an intact material being but as a multi-faceted 
presence in the lives of his contemporaries and successors.  For a certain period, then, he 
can be morally assimilated after his death to the person he was during his lifetime.  Even 
if one feels that the interests of dead people should be given scanty legal protection, one 
                                                     
92  Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 42 [20]. 
93  Brownsword, above n 2, tests a range of possibilities about rights and liberties, in a Hohfeldian sense, 
concerning the use of ones own gametes, and whether their use should be prevented, even if a person 
has consented to their use.  
94  For this reason, Hohfeld is criticised because the theory cannot adequately explain these kinds of 
cases.  Harris, for instance, complains that correlativity implicitly suggests that all judicial questions 
involve two people.  He also observes that judges will use the language of ‘duty’, ‘right’ and so on, 
where the concept is not being employed dispositively as to an issue between X and Y?’  Moreover, 
not only do judges use these terms in a non-relational sense, but they can be caught by the method of 
correlativity which can actually result in the ‘miscuing’ of judgments.  JW Harris, Legal Philosophies 
(Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1997) 88, 90.  
95  N Naffine, ‘Who are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects’ (2003) 66 
Modern Law Review 346, 357, 362-3. 
96  Ibid. 
97  M H Kramer, ‘Do Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights?’ (2001) 14 Canadian Journal of 
Law & Jurisprudence 29, 31-2. 
98  Ibid 47-8. 
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ought to accept that any legal obligations which do noncontingently confer protection on 
those interests have thereby conferred legal rights on the dead.99
 
Holding aside for one moment the possibility that Kramer’s construction of rights of the 
dead would show that the ‘continuing influence’ of the dead person would support the 
actions of the widow, the continuation of personhood in death in the no access cases 
takes a very different reading of rights.  In Hargrave J’s extension of the reasoning of Re 
Gray,100 in AB 2005 the rights do not relate to the continuation of his life, but are 
constructed against an amorphous sense of what is ‘right’.101  If dead people do not 
have rights, is the duty owed to the public or the State, in a Brownswordian sense, as the 
holder of the interests a community may hold in the dead?  The duty constructed is not 
easy to establish, and in this sense appears to be rhetorical, as against the whole world. 
 
The use of these Hohfeldian concepts, however, is expressly acknowledged in a similar 
US decision.  The 9th Circuit US Federal Appeal decision has some interesting 
resonances with Re Gray,102 through its references to the 1872 Rhode Island decision of 
Pierce103 on which Chesterman J based the principle of inviolability.  I will return to the 
use of Pierce104 as an authority in the next part of this article, but in the context of its 
Hohfeldian credentials, the case was employed to provide an historical overview about 
property interests in dead bodies in the 2002 decision in Newman v 
Sathyavaglswaran.105  That case concerned the rights of parents whose deceased 
children's corneas were removed by the Los Angeles County Coroner's office without 
notice or consent, who brought an action alleging a taking of their property without due 
process of law.  It was held that the next of kin have the exclusive right to possess the 
bodies of their deceased family members, thus creating a property interest, which gave 
the parents rights in the corneas.  The Coroner could not take the corneas without due 
process of law.  In the context of explaining the nature of common law interests in dead 
bodies, the majority noted that in 17th century England, it was understood that a person 
had a right to be buried, and there was an ecclesiastical duty for a parish to bury the 
person. This was the subject of examination in Pierce,106 and in relation to that case,the 
opinion of the majority noted in a footnote: 
 
The logical relationship between rights and duties has been the subject of considerable 
academic examination.  Wesley Hohfeld famously described rights and duties as "jural 
correlatives" -- different aspects of the same legal relation.  Oliver Wendell Holmes 
described rights as "intellectual constructs used to describe the consequences of legal 
obligations.  As he puts it, 'legal duties are logically antecedent to legal rights.'  Holmes' 
description appears particularly apt in respect to the law regarding dead bodies where 
duties to provide burial were recognized as flowing from a right of the dead, even though 
                                                     
99  Ibid 48. 
100  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
101  AB v Attorney-General (Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 
27 May 2005) [136].  Marion’s case, or Secretary, Dept of Heath and Community Services v JWN 
and SMB (1982) 175 CLR 218, where it was confirmed that it is unlawful to interfere with the body 
of a living person without their consent: AB v Attorney-General (Vic) [2005] VSC 180 (Unreported, 
Supreme Court of Victoria, Hargrave J, 27 May 2005) [124]. 
102  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
103  Pierce v Swan Point Cemetery (1872) 10 R.I. 227. 
104  Ibid.  
105  287 F.3d 786. 
106  Pierce v Swan Point Cemetery (1872) 10 R.I. 227.  
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"strictly speaking, ... a dead man cannot be said to have rights." Pierce, 10 R.I. at 239,107 
[other references removed]. 
 
While the correlatives make sense as structured in Newman v Sathyavaglswaran, the use 
of Hohfeld in Re Gray108, while possible to deduce, appears to be the window dressing 
needed to clothe a fundamentally moral, and viscerally religious position, in the 
language and method of rationality and reason. 
 
A Finnis and Hohfeld and the moral compass 
 
Hohfeld has been used in this erroneous way before, as a way of supporting a 
profoundly moral argument by Finnis against a claimed right to abortion.  Melanie 
Williams has undertaken a critique of his use of Hohfeldian methods, and the criticisms 
she raises resonate, mutatis mutandis, in relation to moral criticisms of sperm 
harvesting, and the incorrect use of Hohfeld to disguise a moral position.  Williams 
notes ‘it would be a testing exercise to explore a topic such as abortion in terms of 
Hohfeldian analysis’.109  At issue is Finnis’ adoption of Hohfeld’s correlates to ascribe 
the status of ‘person’ to a foetus.  As Williams points out, ‘the claim to such status is 
not only weak in law, it is the very point of contention at the core of the moral 
debate’.110  Moreover, she notes that Hohfeld did not consider the status of the body in 
his analysis of the existence of rights.111  She points out that Finnis uses Hohfeld to 
activate his argument, but having used his methods to claim the analytical high ground 
of reason and rationality, then shifts out of Hohfeld to impose an obligation of duty and 
responsibility of a mother towards her unborn child,112 based in natural law and 
theological notions of feminine self-sacrifice.  Williams excoriates Finnis’ ambush of 
Hohfeldian reason and rationality to reach a natural law position.  She complains: 
 
But if the uniquely insoluble dilemma of unwanted pregnancy can only be resolved in 
moral terms by the sacrifice of feminine autonomy, consigning her to the place of 
biological determinism, to the fracturing of her development and projects, this places here 
in a second order position in the calculus of ethics, to a fatalistic, though morally 
uplifting, acceptance of her lot.  And, so the consolation runs, from such self-sacrifice 
may spring moral rewards unwonted and divine.113
 
The real reason for the decision is Re Gray114 is now apparent, and it is clear that the 
reliance on Hohfeldian method is illusory and is used as a metonymic device to 
rationalise and reason the unstated positioning found in the no access sperm harvesting 
cases. Replace the word pregnancy and abortion with sperm harvesting and post-
mortem ART, and Chesterman J achieves the same moral outcome that Finnis achieved. 
Hohfeld is used to lead to a natural law outcome, or religiously unambiguous decision 
grounded in religiosity and personal viewpoints.  The widows have a duty and 
responsibility to the deceased spouse to bury him, and not to have children post-
mortem.  In Williams’ terms, the widow has been required to sacrifice their desire for a 
                                                     
107  287 F.3d 786, 790–91. 
108  [2001] 2 Qd R 35. 
109  Williams, above n 28, 387. 
110  Ibid 388. 
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112  Ibid 391-3. 
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child, and by denying her, she will be given the opportunity, through her sacrifice, to 
enjoy the ‘morally uplifting acceptance of her lot’.   
 
It is through the use of Hohfeld, and the principles derived from Pierce115 that 
Chesterman J concluded that she must be prevented from accessing and then using her 
husband’s sperm.  But Pierce,116 and the other cases on which Chesterman J based the 
decisions, are problematic as authorities, and need to be considered in more detail, that 
is redolent of Williams’ concerns about the weakness of Finnis’ claims about the legal 
status of the foetus, Chesterman J’s use of authorities is weakened by selectivity, thus 
rendering them unreasonable, irrational, and unnatural. 
 
B Using Pierce 
 
Chesterman J came to use Pierce117 through the dissenting decision of Higgins J in 
Doodeward v Spence.118  It must be remembered that this case concerned the property 
status of a preserved, stillborn two-headed baby.  The majority held that it was property 
for a range of reasons, including its lack of human characteristics, which made it 
undeserving of a Christian burial.119  Higgins J did not agree, and said the preserved 
baby should have been buried, and not become an object of property.120
 
It appears that the dissenting judgment was being relied upon, because it had apparently 
been approved by ‘the English Court of Appeal [which] has recently reaffirmed the 
principle stated by Higgins J in Doodeward [sic]’:121 Dobson v North Tyneside Health 
Authority.122  However, Peter Gibson LJ for the Court of Appeal did not do this,123 
instead noting in general terms the views of textbook writers that executors and 
administrators charged with the duty of interring the body have a right of custody and 
possession of it until it is properly buried, and that if there is no duty to bury, then there 
is no legal right to possession of the body.  But rather than standing for the principle 
that a right to possession of a corpse must be for burial only, the case instead decided 
that the family of the deceased did not have a right in property over her preserved brain 
that had subsequently been disposed of by the hospital.  Indeed, the decision was far 
from convinced about the status of the authorities relating to the ‘no property’ rule, 
                                                     
115  Pierce v Swan Point Cemetery (1872) 10 R.I. 227. 
116  Ibid.  
117  Ibid.  
118  (1908) 6 CLR 406, 422. 
119  Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 416-17 (Barton J). 
120  (1908) 6 CLR 406, 422. 
121  Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, 40 [16]. 
122  [1997] 1 WLR 596. 
123  What Peter Gibson LJ said, [1997] 1 WLR 596, 600 was: 
First, as is stated in Clerk & Lindsell (ibid), "the executors or administrators or other persons charged 
by the law with the duty of interring the body have a right to the custody and possession of it until it 
is properly buried."  In the present case there were no executors and there was no administratrix until 
October 1994, long after the body of the Deceased was buried.  The other persons who are charged 
by the law with the duty of interring the body include, for example, the parent of an infant child who 
dies where the parent has the means to do so (see Clarke v London General Omnibus Co. Ltd. [1906] 
2 K.B. 648 at 659 and Halsbury's Laws 4th ed. para 1017), but I am not aware that there is any 
authority that there is such a duty on the next of kin as such.  If there is no duty, there is no legal right 
to possession of the corpse.  However even if that is wrong and the next of kin do have some right to 
possession of the body, there is no authority that right is otherwise than for the interment or other 
proper disposition of the body. 
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noting the academic research in the field that showed the partial nature of the authorities 
in the area. 
 
The dissenting judgment has not therefore been approved.  But Chesterman J somehow 
came to use the judgment as an imprimatur of approval to use Pierce124 as an authority.  
However, even if the dissenting judgment had been approved, Higgins J did not rely on 
Pierce125 as an authority, but mentioned it in passing only, along with a string of other 
US cases that related to the duty to bury:126
 
In Peirce [sic] v Swan Point Cemetery, the Rhode Island Court, while admitting that there 
was no property in a dead body in the ordinary sense, interfered by injunction to prevent 
the removal of a man’s corpse to another part of the cemetery against the will of his 
daughter and her husband.127  
 
But Chesterman J put it this principle altogether differently: 
 
In one of the American cases cited and apparently relied upon by Higgins J, Peirce [sic] v 
Swan Point Cemetery 14 Am Rep 667 it was said:  
 
That there is no property right in a dead body, using the word in the ordinary sense, may 
well be admitted. . . . there is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to be 
discharged by someone towards the dead; a duty, and we may also say a right, to protect 
from violation; and a duty on the parts of others to abstain from violation.128
 
Higgins J accurately described the 1872 decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
in Pierce, as involving the decision by a widow and the cemetery to move the 
deceased’s remains.129  The man’s child and her husband sought to restore the remains 
to the lot he was originally buried in.  The court ordered that the remains be restored to 
their former place, because he had purchased the burial lot with the wish that he be 
buried in it: 
 
as the body was removed by the widow, without the consent of the child, from a place 
where it was deposited by his own wishes and her consent, we think it should be restored 
to the place whence it came …  It is not necessary to decide at present what might have 
been done if the child had assented, or what the child might do of herself.  And from the 
view we take of the case it is of less consequence to whom the custody is given.130
 
In other words, the case was about the intention of the deceased and his burial, not 
about the intrusion on a body.  Nor did the case concern the violation of a corpse.  
Potter J instead commented, in general terms, about the human response to burial.  I 
have included the sentences that Chesterman J left out of his quote from the case in 
italics: 
 
                                                     
124  Pierce v Swan Point Cemetery (1872) 10 R.I. 227. 
125  Ibid.  
126  Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 422. 
127  Ibid 421. 
128  Re Gray [2001] 2 Qd R 35, R 35, 40 [15]. 
129  Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 421. 
130  Pierce v Swan Point Cemetery (1872) 10 R.I. 227, 242-3. 
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That there is no property right in a dead body, using the word in the ordinary sense, may 
well be admitted.131  Yet the burial of the dead is a subject which interests the feelings of 
mankind to a much greater degree than many matters of actual property.  There is a duty 
imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to be discharged by some one towards the 
dead; a duty, and we may also say a right, to protect from violation and a duty on the part 
of others to abstain from violation; it may therefore be considered as a sort of quasi 
property, and it would be discreditable to any system of law not to provide a remedy in 
such a case.132
 
Potter J had looked at the notion of the possibility of the dead having ‘rights’, but these 
are something exercisable by the family: 
 
Now, strictly speaking, according to the strict rules of the old common law, a dead man 
cannot be said to have rights.  Yet is it common so to speak, and the very fact of the 
common use of such language, and of its being used in such cases as we have quoted, 
justifies us in speaking of it as a right in a certain qualified sense, a right which ought to 
be protected.133
 
The notion of quasi property was significant to understanding the nature of the 
obligation, was also not referred to by Chesterman J: 
 
Although, as we have said, the body is not property in the usually recognized sense of the 
word, yet we may consider it as a sort of quasi property, to which certain persons may 
have rights, as they have duties to perform towards, it arising out of our common 
humanity.  But the person having charge of it cannot be considered as the owner of it in 
any sense whatever; he holds it only as a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may from 
family or friendship have an interest in it, and we think that a court of equity may well 
regulate it as such, and change the custody if improperly managed.134
 
Based on the attitude of the family, Pierce135 thus stands for the principle the 
relationship with the body is filial and related to family, the sacred trust for the benefit 
of all who may from family or friendship have an interest in it, and the nature of the 
relationships that are concerned to ensure a proper treatment of a body.  The idea that a 
body would be left unburied would offend our common humanity.  There is nothing in 
the judgment that, Hercules-like, a court could find to prevent the ongoing family 
interests in pursuing the filial bonds of enabling the continuation of the family through 
the deceased spouse.  Pierce may stand, instead, for the proposition that such a course 
of action be permitted, if the family agree.  If they do not agree, then they are free to 
intervene, and custody changed because of ‘improper management’.  Of course, in the 
sperm harvesting cases, the family supported, rather than rejected her position, so the 





                                                     
131  In a footnote, it was noted that by the old English law the body was not recognised as property, but 
the charge of it belonged to the church and the ecclesiastical courts. 
132  Pierce v Swan Point Cemetery (1872) 10 R.I. 227, 237-9. 
133  Ibid 239-40.  Hohfeld would have claimed the looseness of the use of the language of rights here as 
an example why legal concepts need to be sharply focussed on what they actually do. 
134  Pierce v Swan Point Cemetery (1872) 10 R.I. 227, 242-3.  
135  Ibid 227. 
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Of course, this is a decision of a single judge of a US state made in 1873.  But along the 
lines of the other cases relied upon by Chesterman J, it does not stand for the principle 
of inviolability claimed.  Indeed, the principles that emerge from Pierce136 can be read 
very differently, to instead cherish the choices of family, of a kind proposed by Lior 
Barshack,137 and to potentially allow that family to follow the deceased husband’s 
desire to have a child.138  But Pierce,139 as a precedent, has to be considered with 
caution.  In the US, it went on to have a short and rocky life.  And the principle for 
which it really stood – the ability of a cemetery to move remains – up until the 1920s, it 
was cited in a small series of US cases, but was generally disapproved.  Its value in the 
2002 decision in Newman v Sathyavaglswaran,140 was historical, as Potter J had written 
an excellent history of the law relating to burial.  Its resurrection in Australia, in these 
circumstances, was extraordinary.  What is problematic, however, is its use in Re 
Gray,141 and subsequent adoption in AB 2005,142 to stand for principles never 
contemplated by the facts or circumstances of the case.  Its use, along with the adoption 
of the Hohfeldian correlates of right and duty, have been captured to achieve decisions 
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138  Kramer, above n 97; YZ v Infertility Treatment Authority (General) [2005] VCAT 2655 (Unreported, 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Morris J, 20 December 2005) [40]–[41]. 
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